This paper examines the relationship between precarious employment, legal status, and racialization. We conceptualize legal status to include the intersections of immigration and citizenship. Using the PEPSO survey data we operationalize three categories of legal status: Canadian born, foreign-born citizens, and foreign-born non-citizens. First we examine whether the character of precarious work varies depending on legal status, and find that it does: Citizenship by birth or naturalization reduces employment precarity across most dimensions and indicators. Next, we ask how legal status intersects with racialization to shape precarious employment. We find that employment precarity is disproportionately high for racialized non-citizens. Becoming a citizen mitigates employment precarity. Time in Canada also reduces precarity, but not for non-citizens. Foreign birth and citizenship acquisition intersect with racialization unevenly: Canadian born racialized groups exhibit higher employment precarity than racialized foreign-born citizens. Our analysis underscores the importance of including legal status in intersectional analyses of social inequality.
INTRODUCTION
recarious employment refers to work that does not fit the normative Standard Employment Relationship (SER) because it is part-time and/or temporary. It involves job insecurity, schedule and income unpredictability, little control or autonomy, limited benefits and entitlements, and the absence of regulatory protections (Rodgers 1989; Cranford et al. 2003) .
The Poverty and Employment Project in Southwestern Ontario (PEPSO) project made media headlines in early 2013 with the finding that a surprisingly high share of workers surveyed in Hamilton and the Greater Toronto Area were in "precarious" jobs (Carter 2013; Monsebraaten 2013) . 2 The project's survey is contributing to public discussion by identifying the complex and generally negative implications of precarious employment for the well being of individuals, households and communities (PEPSO 2013) .
The PEPSO survey confirms existing research addressing the question of who is most likely to be in precarious employment: women, immigrants, and racialized groups are more likely to hold such jobs. Quantitative studies that address the relationship between immigration and precarious employment typically use binary classifications, for example, comparing Canadian versus foreign-born populations. Another approach is to focus on the foreign-born and compare citizen immigrants to immigrants who are not citizens, or recent immigrants to those with more time in Canada. This paper makes a conceptual and empirical contribution to research on precarious employment by conceptualizing legal status as a relational process that includes the intersections of immigration and citizenship without excluding Canadian-born populations. We argue that it is important to consider differences between Canadian-born citizens, immigrant citizens, and foreign-born non-citizens. This paper addresses two questions: Does the character of precarious work vary depending on these categories of legal status, and how does legal status intersect with racialization and other factors to shape precarious employment? We also explore whether higher employment precarity is concentrated in particular household income categories. We find support for operationalizing legal status as a non-binary categorical variable based on finding variation in the character of precarious employment based on legal status. Our results indicate that employment precarity is disproportionately high for racialized non-citizens, and that becoming a citizen mitigates employment precarity. However, foreign birth and citizenship acquisition intersect with racialization in complex ways. The concluding discussion includes implications for immigration policy and settlement outcomes.
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT PRECARITY IN RELATION TO IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND RACIALIZATION
Two narratives cut across the literature on precarious employment. One is a narrative of specificity: precarious employment affects some groups more than others. The other is a narrative of commonality: the rise of precarious employment affects everyone, directly or indirectly, so we are all in this together. Existing literature in several fields supports both perspectives, making them less contradictory than they seem. Literatures on global transformations and labour market restructuring argue that precarious work arrangements have become generalized due to multi-scalar processes of economic, regulatory and labour market transformation, and that these processes are accompanied by changes that normalize employment insecurity as flexibility and competitiveness (Lewchuk et al. 2014; Fuller and Vosko 2008; Vosko 2010; Schierup 2007) . At the same time, interlocking dimensions of social location, particularly gender, racialization, ethnic minority status, education, immigration, and age mark those most likely to be in precarious employment (Teelucksing and Galabuzi 2005; Fuller and Vosko 2008; Creese 2007; Noack and Vosko 2011) .
As precarious employment becomes more pervasive, it remains important to analyze its specificities. Changes in Canadian immigration policy highlight the importance of immigration related processes in shaping employment experiences. Noteworthy changes include the rise in temporary resident entries, the expansion of two-step or probationary immigration which requires temporary presence prior to permanent residence, and recent modifications that make citizenship harder to obtain (Sharma 2006; Alboim and Cohl 2012; Goldring and Landolt 2012; Faraday 2012; Goldring 2014; Waldman and Macklin 2014) . Attention to immigration dynamics and associated markers of difference informs our interest in how several dimensions of immigration, including foreign-birth, migratory legal status, and citizenship status intersect with racialization to shape the character and likelihood of precarious employmentfor all workers. 3 There is general agreement that precarious employment involves various dimensions of in/security. Most definitions of precarious employment include the following dimensions: (1) the security or insecurity of employment, with indicators of employment form (e.g., self-employed versus employee, full-time or part-time), terms of employment and tenure (e.g., permanent versus short term, contract type, seasonality, etc.), and sometimes type of employer (e.g., temporary agency, size of firm); (2) income in/stability (e.g., variable and unpredictable income, which may overlap with the stability of the employment relationship, and likelihood of having hours reduced); (3) institutional protections and social benefits (indicated by poorly or unregulated workplaces, cash payment, limited recourse in the face of inequities or problems, and limited or no benefits); and (4) control over the work process, (e.g., limited say over schedules, working on-call, no collective bargaining, etc.) (Cranford et al. 2003; Rodgers 1989) . 4 Studies using secondary data, typically the census and labour market surveys, use available indicators to operationalize and analyze these dimensions.
Research mapping the configuration of precarious employment for various socially defined groups finds variation by social location. Women, immigrants, and racialized populations experience distinct patterns of precarious employment. For example, Noack and Vosko examined four dimensions of job precarity and found that part-time temporary jobs are the most precarious form of employment, and that women, racialized groups, and recent immigrants are most likely to hold such jobs, (2011: 20-21) . The odds of working through a temporary agency, the most precarious form of temporary employment, are highest for visible minority women who are also recent immigrants (Fuller and Vosko 2008: 44) . This literature finds that gender does not operate evenly across immigrant status and racialization: women in certain crosscutting categories may do better than men. However, immigration and racialization combine to increase the likelihood of working in jobs with distinctive configurations of dimensions of precarious work.
Existing research has also established that precarious employment is more prevalent among women, racialized groups, immigrants, and people with low incomes (Cranford et al. 2003; Creese 2007; Noack and Vosko 2011; Teelucksingh and Galabuzi 2005) . Quantitative research on precarious employment that addresses immigration and racialization typically compares binary categories such as Canadian-born versus foreign-born, and non-racialized (or white) versus racialized (or visible minority) workers, while controlling for gender, education and other factors. In addition to examining the distribution of indicators of precarious employment, some researchers look at the concentration of workers in occupations characterized by multiple dimensions of precarious employment (such as jobs classified as low-skilled in construction, agriculture, and services). This literature is very consistent: foreign-born workers-particularly recent immigrants-are more likely to be in precarious jobs than Canadian-born counterparts, and racialized groups are also more likely to hold precarious jobs compared to white or non-racialized groups (Teelucksing and Galabuzi 2005; Creese 2007; Noack and Vosko 2011) . Qualitative studies that consider the intersections of racialization, gender and immigration echo these findings. 5 It is not very surprising that longstanding processes of racialization and discrimination intersect with foreign birth and barriers such as credential recognition and lack of Canadian experience to stratify labour markets (Pendakur and Pendakur 1996; Ornstein 2006; Teelucksing and Galabuzi 2005; Sakamoto et al. 2010) . From this perspective, it is also not surprising that immigrant earnings are lower than those of Canadian-born counterparts with similar levels of education, and that it takes at least a decade for their earnings to converge (Galarneau and Morissette 2008; Picot and Sweetman 2012) . However, the literature discussed so far does little to examine the effects of other categories of legal status (and the social relations associated with them) that may also shape the likelihood of holding precarious employment.
Two processes and related categories deserve closer attention: (1) the intersections of citizenship acquisition and Canadian vs. foreign birth, and (2) various forms of non-immigrant non-citizenship including temporary migrants. Citizenship gives immigrants the same formal legal status as people who are citizens because they were born in Canada. This means their presence and legal status are relatively secure; they have the same entitlements, protections and obligations as citizens; and they can apply for government jobs. But how does this affect the quality of their employment?
Research on the relationship between citizenship acquisition and immigrant employment outcomes is complicated by questions about causal ordering and selection (are immigrants with higher earning more likely to naturalize, and/or does naturalization lead to higher earnings?) DeVorez and Pivnenko (2008) find that citizenship provides a 15 percent wage advantage for foreign-born citizens compared to non-citizen immigrants. They also find that "immigrant citizens from non-OECD countries enjoyed a greater wage advantage than non-citizens from OECD countries (28.9 percent vs. 9.8 percent) " (2008: 43) . DeVoretz and Pivnenko's classification of source regions indicates that racialized immigrants experience greater economic returns to citizenship acquisition. These immigrants may have greater incentives to naturalize, perhaps to address racialized wage ceilings and discrimination (Pendakur and Woodcock 2010; Pendakur and Pendakur 1996) .
Qualitative and quantitative studies on temporary migrant workers find a strong relationship between temporary migratory status, racialization and precarious employment, or "3-D jobs" (dirty, dangerous and difficult or demeaning). This association is stronger for temporary workers classified as "low-skilled," such as agriculture and care work, but can also hold for people with international study permits and refugee claimants, and temporary workers in the service sector (Abboud 2012; Bakan and Stasiulis 1997; Goldring and Landolt 2011; Hennebry 2012; Hennebry and Preibisch 2010; Polanco and Zell 2012; Sinziana 2013) .
Part of the explanation for the greater employment precarity and vulnerability of people working with temporary permits is that their authorized presence status is tied to their work permit. They are deportable if the terms of their permit are breached (Preibisch and Binford 2007; Walia 2010; Hennebry and Preibisch 2010b; Faraday 2012) . In addition, they have limited or uneven coverage under employment standards and related regulatory protections precisely by virtue of their being not only outside the boundary of citizenship, but also outside the category of "immigrant." Their vulnerability is institutionally produced and sanctioned through laws, regulations, and policies that are crosscut by racialization (Baines and Sharma 2002; Sharma 2006; Walia 2010; Vosko 2010; Faraday 2012; Fudge 2012; Lenard and Straehle 2013; Goldring and .
Drawing on these literatures raises questions about how a non-binary array of legal status situations shapes the likelihood of precarious employment. This calls for comparing the experiences of people in a wider set of legal status categories, so as to consider the effects of temporary versus permanent status, non-citizenship and citizenship, and how citizenship intersects with foreignbirth.
Researchers studying precarious employment, immigration, citizenship and racialization using existing large-scale secondary data face the challenge of finding one set of data with all of the information required, at the appropriate level of detail and unit of analysis (Cf. Goldring and Landolt 2012; Joly 2010) . Some data sets have information on income and/or employment, but not immigration. Others have information on immigration, racialization and/or ethnicity, but little on employment. Immigration data is a particular challenge because it is typically presented in binary terms (e.g., for Canadian-born versus immigrants), and because data with rich information on immigration dynamics usually does not include Canadian-born respondents-so they cannot be analyzed together. It is particularly challenging to find data that includes information on non-citizens who are not permanent residents and their legal status dynamics. 6 These challenges make it difficult to compare Canadian-and foreign-born populations while at the same time analyzing legal status dynamics within these populations, as well as considering racialization and other factors.
The PEPSO survey allows us to address this challenge because it provides information for Canadian-and foreign-born populations. It includes detailed information on employment, and data on foreign birth and immigration status at the time of the survey. It does not offer information on legal status on entry to Canada, so it is not possible to determine whether any respondents were temporary entrants before becoming permanent residents. Nevertheless, the data allow us to construct non-binary categories of legal status based on nativity and citizenship. This allows us to analyze the intersections of citizenship and immigration status and racialization and their impact on employment with data on Canadian-born and immigrant populations, taking into account various legal status situations.
Our analysis contributes to contemporary discussions in at least two ways. First, we join calls to pay attention to the intersections of employment and social location. In doing so, we stress the importance of including legal status as a dimension of intersectional social location. Our focus here is on legal status and racialization, but we recognize that gender is another important dimension of social location. 7 Second, we operationalize legal status taking into account whether or not respondents were born in Canada, and if not, whether they had become citizens. Informed by the concept of precarious legal status, we go beyond binary definitions of legal status based on nativity (Canadian vs. foreignborn or immigrant), citizenship (citizen versus non-citizen), or immigration status (immigrant versus temporary resident). Finally, our work points to the value of developing sources of information that allow researchers to study how the intersections of legal status, racialization and other dimensions of social location in turn intersect with employment precarity and other employment outcomes, over time.
METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE
The PEPSO survey was designed to capture information about the population living in the Greater Toronto Area-Hamilton labour markets. A telephone survey was conducted in the fall of 2011 with a sample of 4,165 people living in Toronto, several municipalities in the Greater Toronto Area, Hamilton and Burlington. 8 While steps were taken to represent the population in these areas, the sample under represents certain immigrant and racialized groups, particularly the Chinese born population in Toronto (PEPSO 2013: 104) . PEPSO survey findings involving immigration, ethnicity and racialization may therefore underestimate the extent and significance of precarious employment among immigrants and racialized groups. Nevertheless, the PEPSO survey includes detailed employment data for Canadian-born and foreign-born respondents as well as selected immigration information, allowing us to analyze the intersections of legal status and racialization across these groups. We use crosstabulations and significance tests to explore the data.
We situate the PEPSO sample in relation to available data on citizenship and immigration in Table 1 , which presents data from the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS) and selected PEPSO data for Toronto and Hamilton. 9 Compared to the population estimates in the NHS, the Toronto and Hamilton PEPSO subsamples slightly over-represent the share of the population born in Canada by approximately eight and five percentage points, respectively. The PEPSO subsamples under-represent the share of foreign-born citizens, but the difference is small. What stands out is the lower proportion of immigrants who are not citizens in the Toronto sample, where the PEPSO sample shows 5 percent compared to the population estimate of 11.5 percent. The PEPSO sample also under-represents non-citizen immigrants in Hamilton. The NHS immigrant noncitizen category is overwhelmingly made up of landed immigrants who are eligible to apply for citizenship. 10 The low proportion of these non-citizens in the NHS is consistent with Canada's high naturalization rates but their low share in the PEPSO sample suggests that non-citizens are more difficult to reach and/or less likely to respond to telephone surveys.
The last row in Table 1 provides information on temporary residents. The PEPSO sample has low numbers for Toronto (18), Hamilton (4), and the rest of the sample (16, not shown). The share for Toronto (1 percent) under-represents the proportion of temporary residents in the NHS (1.66 percent). However, the NHS data on temporary residents under-estimates this population, as it is lower than CIC's figures for temporary residents still present in Toronto and Hamilton. 11 The challenge of obtaining a representative sample mentioned earlier, with respect to permanent residents who are not citizens, seems to extend to sampling temporary residents, and may be more acute. 
UNPACKING LEGAL STATUS
To operationalize legal status in non-binary terms we divided the sample into three categories based on the intersections of foreign birth and citizenship status: Canadian-born (n=2519), foreign-born citizens (n=1405), and foreign-born noncitizens (n=191). 12 We refer to these as three categories of legal status and underscore that they take into account foreign birth status and citizenship. 13 Table 2 presents a socio-demographic profile of the full PEPSO sample by legal status. In addition to providing information on the sample, it identifies characteristics that vary according to legal status. Foreign-born citizens are more similar to Canadian-born respondents in the sample in terms of gender and age than foreign-born non-citizens, who were more likely to be men and younger in age. The under-representation of Canadian-born racialized groups is evident. The proportion of respondents in racialized groups is significantly higher for all of the foreign-born respondents in comparison to Canadian-born respondents. About 11 percent of Canadian-born citizens identified with one of the non-white categories, compared to 62 percent of respondents in each of the foreign-born categories. The South Asian and Black categories accounted for the highest concentrations of respondents across the foreign-born categories.
There is a positive relationship between length of time in Canada and citizenship acquisition. 14 Nearly nine out of ten foreign-born citizens had been in Canada ten years or longer, compared to nearly four out of ten non-citizens. Educational attainment was measured in terms of type of highest degree or certificate. The distributions are fairly similar across legal status categories.
Individual income distribution varies across the three categories of legal status, with the sharpest difference for non-citizens compared to the two categories of citizens. Canadian-born respondents are clustered in the $40,000 to $80,000 ranges, with 17 percent earning over $100,000. Most foreign-born citizens are in the second and third income categories ($20,000 to $59,999), with 12 percent earning over $100,000. Non-citizens are more likely to be in the two lowest income categories (up to $39,999), with 7 percent earning over $100,000. This finding suggests that there is an income advantage to being born in Canada, and that for immigrants, acquiring citizenship (and perhaps longer time in Canada) also pays off. This is consistent with DeVoretz and Pivnenko's (2008) findings of returns to naturalization, but we note that an income gap remains between Canadian and foreign-born citizens. 15 A similar pattern is evident with respect to household income. The Low Income Measure (LIM) is a relative measure of household income that controls for household size and location, and is used in international comparisons (Statistics Canada 2013) . 16 We created a variable with three categories: the lowest for respondents in households whose pre-tax household income adjusted for size was under the LIM, the middle one for respondents in households whose size and incomes fell between the LIM and three times the LIM, and the third for respondents whose adjusted household income put them over three times the LIM. Respondents in the first category live in poor or low-income households. As shown in Table 2 , non-citizens are more likely to live in poor households (24.05 percent), followed by foreign-born citizens (13.58 percent) and the Canadianborn (4.8 percent). Canadian-born respondents are most likely to live in households in the highest LIM category (64.11 percent). Citizenship acquisition thus offers better prospects in terms of adjusted household income, but Canadian birth is associated with the highest rates of high household income.
To summarize, several socio-demographic factors vary across the legal status categories. Racialized groups are concentrated in the two categories of foreignborn. Both foreign birth and citizenship matter with respect to age, individual income, and adjusted household income. Among the foreign-born, citizenship acquisition and longer time in Canada appear to be associated.
EXPLORING LEGAL STATUS AND INDICATORS OF EMPLOYMENT PRECARITY
In this section we explore variation in the character of precarious employment by examining dimensions and key indicators of precarious employment by legal status. Table 3 displays frequencies for our indicators of employment precarity broken down by three categories of legal status. To learn whether and how foreign birth and citizenship acquisition matter for specific dimensions and indicators of precarious employment, we conducted a pair-wise comparison for the indicators in the legal status columns. 17 This allowed us to first examine on which dimensions and indicators of employment precarity Canadian-born workers differ most from foreign-born citizens and non-citizens; and second, where citizenship acquisition matters, as indicated by important differences between foreign-born citizens and non-citizens.
FOREIGN BIRTH
Results from Table 3 shows that employment precarity is generally higher for both categories of foreign-born respondents compared to those born in Canada; this holds for some indicators of each of the first three dimensions of precarious employment. While there are differences in the dimension of autonomy and control based on foreign birth and obtaining citizenship, they are not statistically significant. 18 Indicators of employment in/stability show mixed patterns for the effect of foreign birth. Non-standard employment rates are not significantly different for Canadian and foreign-born citizens, though they are for these two compared to non-citizens. The most pronounced differences between Canadian-born and foreign-born citizens are for self-employment (with no employees) and for employment through a temporary agency. In many other ways, both groups are similar for this dimension of precarious work.
Significant differences between foreign-born and Canadian-born workers are notable in the dimension of social protection and work place regulation. Foreignborn citizens and non-citizens are both more likely to report receiving no pay if they miss work and to report that raising a health or safety issue or an employment rights concern would negatively affect their employment. On these two indicators of precarity, there is no significant difference between foreignborn citizens and non-citizens. It is also clear that foreign-birth matters when it comes to one of the indicators of income instability: the likelihood of having one's hours reduced. Income instability is however one dimension of employment precarity where foreign-birth seems to matter less than citizenship status: greater income variability is reported among non-citizens than both groups of citizens. This result points to the importance of further exploring how employment precarity varies by citizenship status. Foreign-born non-citizens exhibit distinct patterns of employment precarity when compared to foreign-born citizens (Table 3) . Citizenship, whether by birth or naturalization, seems to translate into employment that is less precarious across the board, while non-citizenship is associated with higher employment precarity. Looking across dimensions of employment precarity, it is clear that becoming a citizen matters along all four dimensions. Non-citizens have the highest rates on two indicators of employment in/stability: working through a temporary agency and having non-standard employment. For example, among non-citizens, 64 percent have non-standard employment compared to 48 percent and 50 percent for Canadian-born and foreign-born citizens, and 8 percent work through a temporary agency, more than two and four times the percentage for foreign-born and Canadian-born citizens. The observed patterns demonstrate greater similitude between Canadian-born citizens and foreign-born citizens, especially when it comes to non-standard employment and suggest that the lack of citizenship matters more here than foreign birth.
Although less pronounced, income variability also appears to decline by becoming a citizen. Here, the difference is between non-citizens and citizens, whether foreign-born or Canadian-born. The lack of employment benefits and receiving payment in cash are two additional indicators of employment precarity where significant differences exist between citizens and non-citizens, although certainly most notable on the first indicator. Results show that non-citizens are almost five times more likely to receive their pay in cash most of the time than Canadian-born and foreign-born citizens. Finally, citizenship also shapes the likelihood of having one's hours reduced-which speaks to both control and autonomy as well as income in/stability. On this indicator, non-citizens stand out for reporting that this was likely or very likely compared to Canadian and foreign-born citizens.
A conclusion to draw at this point is that legal status plays a significant role in shaping employment precarity, across dimensions. In particular, being a citizen reduces employment precarity in relative terms: both Canadian and foreign-born citizens tend to be less precarious on most indicators and dimensions compared to non-citizens. Whether citizens were born in Canada matters for some but not all indicators. This is an argument for unpacking immigrant versus non-immigrant classifications, at least by citizenship, so as to distinguish between foreign-born citizens and non-citizens, and ideally by other categories of migratory legal status as well. Preliminary results (not shown) suggest that permanent residents are often, though not always, less precarious compared to "other" non-citizens.
LEGAL STATUS, RACIALIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT PRECARITY
Indexes provide a way of grouping and summarizing related indicators and dimensions of a broader process or phenomena. We use the employment precarity index developed by the PEPSO project (Lewchuck et al. 2013) . 19 The index combines the ten indicators of precarious employment presented in Table 3 into a 100-point scale. To simplify analysis and interpretation, the index was transformed into a variable with four categories based on quartiles. In decreasing order of employment precarity, the categories are "secure," "stable," "vulnerable," and "precarious."
LEGAL STATUS
We examine employment precarity as measured by categories of the employment precarity index in relation to legal status by considering the effects of foreign birth and citizenship. The first part of Table 4 (on the left) presents a cross-tabulation of employment precarity by foreign-birth status. It shows that Canadian-born workers can be found in fairly similar proportions in each of the employment precarity categories. In contrast, foreign-born respondents (regardless of citizenship status) are under represented in the secure employment precarity category and over represented in the precarious and vulnerable categories. Table 4 also breaks down the foreign-born group into citizens and non-citizens (right hand side). Results show that non-citizens experience greater employment precarity compared to both foreign-born citizens and Canadian-born respondents, and the association between citizenship and employment precarity is more significant (p<0.001) than that between foreignborn status and employment precarity (p<0.01). Thus, legal status broken down by foreign birth and citizenship identifies specific vulnerabilities to employment precarity. 20 The effect of citizenship acquisition on reducing employment precarity may be related to length of time in Canada. Canada's comparatively high rate of citizenship acquisition has been noted (Bloemraad 2002) . However, changes in immigration policy may affect this rate by narrowing eligibility and generating greater variation in time lines for becoming a citizen. It is therefore worth considering whether citizenship acquisition and time in Canada have distinct effects on employment precarity. The first part of Table 5 shows that foreign-born respondents with less time in Canada (under ten years) have a higher likelihood of being in vulnerable or precarious jobs compared to those with ten or more years in Canada, and to Canadian-born respondents. Overall, levels of employment precarity among foreign-born respondents with ten years or more in Canada are more similar to those of the Canadian-born than those of recent newcomers. The right hand panel breaks down time in Canada by legal status; the differences here are also statistically significant. Results indicate that citizenship can have an effect that is distinct from time in Canada, as it offers more protection against employment precarity than time in Canada, particularly for those who have been in Canada longer. Foreign-born citizens with over ten years in Canada are clearly more likely to hold secure and stable jobs (50 percent) compared to non-citizens in the same time categories (34 percent). The rights and protections associated with formal citizenship may account for this significant reduction in employment precarity. While more time in Canada is associated with lower employment precarity for foreign-born citizens, this relationship is minimal for non-citizens. The distribution of non-citizens among precarity categories is similar regardless of time in Canada. For time in Canada to make a positive difference, it must be accompanied by citizenship acquisition. Similarly, the disadvantages of non-citizenship appear to accumulate and be compounded over time. One potential explanation for this is that immigrants with longer time in Canada who have not become citizens may be more likely to have experienced forms of precarious immigration status in their trajectories . The PEPSO sample does not allow us to test that possibility.
RACE AND RACIALIZATION
Racialization, or meaning attributed to people, places, and processes based on understandings of difference based on "race," is a pervasive dimension of labour market stratification and social inequality in Canada, and other contexts (Galabuzi 2006; Pendakur and Pendakur 1996; Wilson et al. 2011) . Table 6 presents a cross-tabulation of employment precarity by foreign-birth status and racialization. Results are consistent with the literature and show that race and foreign-birth matter: Being foreign-born is associated with greater employment precarity compared to being Canadian born. At the same time, within each nativity category, racialized respondents are less likely to be in secure jobs and more likely to be in precarious jobs compared to their non-racialized counterparts. 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 p-value p<0.001 p<0.001 Table 6 also presents information for employment precarity and the intersections of citizenship status and racialization. The interaction between citizenship and racialization is uneven across legal status categories. Racialization matters less within the category of foreign-born citizens. Although the share of white foreign-born citizens in secure work is slightly higher than the share of racialized foreign-born citizens, the proportion of respondents in vulnerable and precarious jobs is the same (52 percent) for these racialized and non-racialized immigrant citizens. However, racialized differences are noticeable within the Canadian-born and non-citizen categories: white respondents in these two legal status categories are more likely to precarity categories compared to racialized respondents most for employment precarity for non-citizens are in the most secure employment precarity category, compared to 16 percent of white non-citizens, and 19 non-racialized foreign-born citizens, respectively. racialization to reduce racialized employment precarity differences for foreign born citizens compared to n employment precarity.
HOUSEHOLD INCOME, LEGAL STATUS AND RAC
We examine employment precarity in status, racialization and adjusted household income in Figure 1 . includes only those respondents in the two highest categories of employment precarity (groups here as "precarious").
Precarious/V Adjusted Household Income (LIM) and Racialization
Household income is measured with the LIM earlier (Table 2) , and is nested in legal status categories are more likely to be in secure and stable employment compared to racialized respondents. Racialization matters most for employment precarity for non-citizens: only 8.77 percent of racialized citizens are in the most secure employment precarity category, compared to citizens, and 19 percent and 22 percent of racialized and born citizens, respectively. Citizenship interacts with educe racialized employment precarity differences for foreign compared to non-citizens, who have the highest concent
LEGAL STATUS AND RACIALIZATION
We examine employment precarity in relation to the intersections of legal status, racialization and adjusted household income in Figure 1 . 21 This figure includes only those respondents in the two highest categories of employment (groups here as "precarious"). precarious respondents within a given income category, in each legal status category, calculated separately for white and racialized respondents. For example, among non-racialized respondents, 38 percent of Canadian-born respondents in the highest adjusted household income category were in precarious employment (and 62 percent were in the secure-stable employment category), while the comparable figure for racialized respondents was 46 percent (with 54 percent in the secure or stable category).
Several patterns are clear. First, in generally terms, household income reduces or mitigates employment precarity within each legal status category, regardless of racialization. That is, there is an overall association between lower household income and higher rates of employment precarity within legal status categories, for white and racialized groups. The exception is for white noncitizens, who display a non-linear (inverted U-shaped) pattern; but here too, the highest income group has the lowest share of high employment precarity.
Second, racialization intersects with adjusted household income in uneven ways within the legal status categories. Racialized non-citizens in all income groups are most likely to be in the most precarious employment categories. Canadian-born respondents in the lowest household income group (under the LIM) do not differ much by racialization; white respondents are marginally more likely to hold more precarious jobs (by two percentage points). However, precarity decreases more sharply by income category for non-racialized respondents and the gap between them and racialized respondents increases with higher household income. Racialized Canadian-born respondents in the highest household income category exhibit somewhat higher shares of vulnerable-precarious employment (46.5 percent) compared to their nonracialized counterparts (37 percent). Turning to citizens born outside Canada, racialized immigrant citizens are slightly less likely to have precarious jobs than their non-racialized counterparts, but the differences are not large. Higher household income mitigates or reduces the likelihood of higher employment precarity for these non-racialized and racialized respondents. Finally, among non-citizens, racialized differences are sharper. The gap between racialized and non-racialized respondents is fairly wide in the lowest and highest household income categories. Race matters most for non-citizens: racialized non-citizens in the lowest income category are most likely to be in the vulnerable-precarious category, and being in a high household income category still finds 62 percent in this employment precarity category compared to 48 percent of non-racialized high-income respondents.
Another way to examine these data is to compare income and racialized groups (columns) across income categories. This shows another noteworthy pattern: foreign-birth and citizenship intersect such that there is a higher rate of employment precarity among Canadian-born racialized respondents in middleincome households compared to foreign-born racialized respondents in the same bracket. That is, racialized immigrant citizens are more likely to have better quality jobs than racialized Canadian-born respondents. Further analysis of the PEPSO data is necessary to understand the role of other factors, including education, discrimination, and occupation and sector of employment.
Fourth, the benefits of citizenship for reducing employment precarity among the foreign-born holds for racialized respondents. Racialized non-citizens have higher rates of employment precarity, across income categories, compared to foreign-born citizens. However, racialization is uneven within the foreign-born citizen group, where racialized respondents have slightly lower rates of employment precarity compared to non-racialized respondents in the same household income category.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
There is general agreement in the literature that immigrants and racialized groups are more likely to hold precarious jobs. Our analysis confirms this. In addition, we show that obtaining citizenship makes a difference by reducing employment precarity among the foreign-born. We found variation in the character and incidence of precarious employment across three categories of legal status that take into account foreign birth as well as citizenship. The positive effects of citizenship in mitigating employment precarity hold for racialized immigrants, as employment precarity rates are particularly high for racialized non-citizens.
Our analysis makes several contributions to the literature on the specificities of precarious employment, and to related policy and public discussion. First, for those interested in immigration and citizenship, we demonstrated the importance of conceptualizing legal status in plural, non-binary, terms. The PEPSO data allowed us to take into account foreign birth status (Canadian-born versus foreign-born) and citizenship (yes or no), which we used to create a legal status variable with three categories (Canadian-born, foreign-born citizens, and non-citizens). This allowed us to consider the potentially distinct effects of Canadian birth and citizenship acquisition. As noted earlier, data limitations prevented us from further breaking down the category of non-citizens.
Indicators of dimensions of employment precarity broken down by these categories of legal status show that citizenship is associated with lower levels of precarity compared to non-citizenship. Employment precarity was higher for non-citizens compared to citizens, for most indicators and all dimensions, regardless of whether citizens were born in Canada or not. At the same time, the effect of citizenship appeared to vary by birth-status: Canadian-born citizens were generally less precarious than foreign-born citizens, but the differences between these groups varied in magnitude and direction. For non-citizens the differences were generally larger. Thus, overall, as we compare across legal status categories, starting with Canadian citizenship by birth compared to foreign-born citizenship, and then comparing foreign-born citizens to noncitizens, employment precarity increases. Pair-wise statistical comparisons support the conclusion that legal status is associated with differences in employment precarity across dimensions, and that non-citizens are significantly different and more precarious compared to foreign-born citizens and Canadianborn citizens.
Second, employment precarity does not always decrease with time in Canada. Longer time in Canada is associated with lower employment precarity among foreign-born citizens, but has a minimal effect for non-citizens. This suggests that time in Canada must be accompanied by citizenship acquisition to make a beneficial difference. Since permanent residence is a prerequisite for citizenship, our results support the promotion of timely naturalization among eligible non-citizens, and inclusive access to citizenship in order to reduce employment precarity among immigrants. This implies that the balance between temporary versus permanent immigrant entry needs to be recalibrated, with serious consideration to shifting in favour of permanent entry. Furthermore, the uncertainty and length of time spent in temporary or probationary categories should be minimized. These points are consistent with wider calls for immigration, refugee, and temporary migration policy reform (Alboim and Cohl 2012; Faraday 2012; Goldring and Landolt 2012; Valiani 2009 ).
Third, racialization and legal status intersect in complex and not always linear patterns in relation to employment precarity. Racialized non-citizens have higher rates of precarity than racialized foreign-born citizens. This is consistent with the literature on the effects of citizenship acquisition on immigrant earnings (DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2008) . It is encouraging to find small differences in employment precarity between racialized and non-racialized foreign-born citizens. However, among Canadian-born citizens, racialized groups are underrepresented in the secure and stable employment precarity categories. This pattern is troubling and echoes concerns about the racialization of glass ceilings raised in research on wage disparities (Pendakur and Woodcock 2010) .
Past research has found that precarious employment and low-income tend to be associated. In the context of labour market and wider economic transformations, this may be changing. The 2013 PEPSO project report documented employment precarity among middle-income households. We showed that there is specificity to employment precarity that is associated with the intersections of legal status and racialization, with racialized non-citizens at greater risk of higher employment precarity. When we examined these intersections in relation to adjusted household income we found that low household income and high employment precarity were associated, across legal status categories and racialization. At the same time, rates of employment precarity among middle-income households were slightly higher for racialized respondents in the Canadian-born and non-citizen categories. Because the sample has a large share of Canadian-born respondents, this finding is quite robust and confirms the importance of examining the intersections of legal status and racialization. We also found that racialized non-citizens in the lower and higher income categories had noticeably higher rates of employment precarity compared to those in comparable income brackets and across legal status categories. Non-citizenship and racialization stand out as factors associated with high employment precarity and low income, but the relationships between these processes are not uniform across legal status categories.
Our findings regarding the role of citizenship in reducing employment precarity indicate that this social boundary is becoming a key dimension of labour market stratification. In addition to promoting access to citizenship, another policy and advocacy response is to limit the sources of difference in employment precarity between citizens and non-citizens. This would mean harmonizing up, for example, by extending employment standards to all workers regardless of citizenship or immigrant status, and enforcing them; eliminating barriers to collective bargaining that exist for temporary workers in some jurisdictions; and implementing other measures to reduce incentives to treat workers differently on the basis of legal status. 22 Our work also points to the challenges of capturing interlocking dimensions of social location with quantitative tools; we nevertheless consider these findings provocative and worthy of further analysis. Such analyses could build on current work by using a multi-dimensional approach to legal status categories-one that considers place of birth, citizenship and additional categories of non-citizenship.
NOTES

1
This paper is based on data generated by the United Way Toronto-McMaster University SSHRC CURA project on Poverty and Employment Precarity in Southern Ontario (PEPSO). We are grateful to the project for funding to support data analysis. Wayne Lewchuk and two anonymous reviewers provided valuable comments.
2
The headline's claim that 50 percent of respondents were in precarious jobs is slightly misleading because it glosses over the distinction between the standard employment relationship (SER) and precarious employment. As discussed later in the paper, the SER is a narrower term that refers to permanent, full-time employment with benefits, while precarious employment is a broader multi-dimensional concept. The PEPSO report did find that only half of participants were in standard employment relationships. However, the rate of precarious employment depends in part on one's definition. A narrow definition of precarious employment as that which is temporary, casual, short-term, fixed term, or self-employed without employees, would put the prevalence at 18 percent for the GTA and Hamilton in 2011 (PEPSO 2013:16, 18) . This is consistent with a 2007 national-level estimate of 21 percent (Vosko et al. 2009 cited in PEPSO 2013 . However, nearly 10 percent were in permanent but part-time positions, and around 20 percent were in relationships that were in a gray area between the SER and employment through temp agencies, etc. The employment precarity index used in the PEPSO report offers a more comprehensive picture of precarious employment (see discussion below). 3 We do not focus on gender in this paper, although we recognize that it is a fundamental and crosscutting dimension of social location. Other articles in this special issue that use PEPSO data focus on gender. Moreover, research on the gendering of employment precarity is consistent and robust, confirming gender as a significant determinant of precarious employment. 4 Some analysts include low income as an additional dimension of precarious jobs, while others do not and can then examine the association between precarious employment and earnings (Cranford, Vosko, and Zukewich 2003: 9; Goldring and Landolt 2009, 2011; Lewchuck, Wolff, and King 2007; Porthé et al. 2010: 18; Rodgers 1989) .
5
Examples include the literature on the Live-in Caregiver Program (e.g., Arat-Koc 1997; Cohen 1994; Bakan and Stasiulis 1997; and Valiani 2009) ; and the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (e.g., Preibisch 2007 Preibisch , 2010 Hennebry 2009 ). 6 The concept of precarious status (Goldring, Berinstein, and Bernhard 2009 ) captures these non-immigrant non-citizen situations, but involves more than vulnerability rooted in a particular form of temporary status or lack of authorization. It includes attention to trajectories that cross legal status categories, in directions that are not always linear or predictable, and which may involve churning through various temporary categories and perhaps unauthorized status before gaining the relative security of permanent residence, or becoming "illegalized" (Bauder 2013; Goldring and Landolt 2013; Landolt and Goldring 2013; McLaughlin and Hennebry 2013) . The dynamics of negotiating legal status situations over time can have negative impacts on job quality and prospects for improving job quality (Goldring and Landolt 2011; McLaughlin and Hennebry 2013). 7 We recognize that citizenship and legal status are much more than categories or statuses, but focus on status given the data.
8
For information about the survey methodology and sample, see Lewchuk et al. (2013: 104-105) . 9 The National Household Survey (NHS) replaced the census in 2011. Toronto and Hamilton are the geographies included from the PEPSO data in Table 1 to simplify comparison with the NHS; they are the largest single geographic units in the sample.
10
According to Statistics Canada, the non-citizen immigrant category also includes stateless people.
11
According to Citizenship and Immigration's (2012) , in 2011 the number of temporary workers and international students living in Toronto who entered that year was 57,545, while 111,808 were "still present" and living there in December. For Hamilton, the numbers were 2,256 who entered in 2011 and 7,856 still present.
12
Respondents who were not born in Canada were asked about their current immigration status. One hundred and ninety-one were not citizens. Of these, 152 were permanent residents and 38 were not. Eighteen of these 38 non-citizen respondents had temporary visas; the other 20 were in another unspecified category.
Six cases had missing information for immigration status. We grouped the permanent and non-permanent residents together in the "non-citizen" category because the small number of non-permanent residents does not allow us to analyze them separately due to small cell sizes. 13 We use legal status as a wide rubric that conveys whether or not one was born in Canada, and citizenship status. "Migrant legal status" (Fudge 2012 ) could be used, since there are other types of legal status associated with distinct configurations of rights (e.g., indigenous status, or criminalized status). However, we want to include Canadian born respondents and distinguish them from foreign-born citizens for several reasons. First, although Canadian born and "naturalized" citizens have the same rights, the fragility of citizenship for foreign-born citizens, particularly those racialized as Muslim, has been noted (Nyers 2006) . Second, citizenship does not mitigate social inequality. Race, gendered, class, and other relations cut across the divide between citizens and non-citizens. Third, to examine whether citizenship acquisition is related to differences with regard to employment we need to distinguish between foreign-born and Canadian born citizens, and between immigrant citizens and immigrant non-citizens. (Unfortunately the data do not allow us to consider multiple categories of non-citizens.) 14 Currently, permanent residents wanting to apply for citizenship must have lived in Canada for three of the previous four years. 15 This result could change in a regression analysis that controls for other factors.
16
The LIM is set at 50 percent of median household income, adjusted for household size and location (e.g., urban versus rural). For 2011, the year of the survey, the LIM for before tax income for a one-person household in an urban center was $22,720. The LIM is then adjusted for higher household sizes (Statistics Canada 2013).
17
We conducted a pairwise comparison among our three categories of legal status. Pearson chi-square tests were then performed for each pair. We also adjusted for problems encountered with multiple testing (SAS 2014). 18 However, the likelihood of having one's hours reduced, which is significantly different for Canadian born and foreign-born respondents, could also be considered an indicator of limited autonomy and control. 19 An employment precarity index can be used to track changes in the composite measure over time, to gauge the relationship between the index and other variables, and to examine index variation among different population sub-groups (Goldring and Landolt 2009, 2011). 20 In a related analysis that added gender (not presented here), we found that Canadian born women were significantly more likely to have secure employment, while foreign-born male citizens and non-citizen men and women were disproportionately under-represented in the secure category and non-citizen women were over represented in the precarious category.
21
Figure 1 is based on cross-tabulations not presented here of legal status by employment precarity and household income nested in legal status. The crosstabulations show that higher household income is associated with more stable and secure employment, for racialized and non-racialized respondents, across legal status categories.
22
Again, this coincides with the recommendations of other analysts, including Faraday (2012) , Alboim and Cohl (2012) , Fudge (2012) , Goldring and Vosko (2011) .
